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MAKING A KILLING IN REAL ESTATE:
SOLVING THE MYSTERY OF MURDER'S
EFFECT ON TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
IN NEW YORK-A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
KATHLEEN REILLYt

INTRODUCTION

In 1889, sixteen-year-old Elmer E. Palmer murdered his
grandfather to secure his inheritance.
Fearing that his
grandfather's lavish bequest to him would be revoked, Elmer
killed his grandfather with poison.1 Elmer never received his
inheritance, however, because the New York Court of Appeals
held that by reason of his crime, he had surrendered any interest
2
he may have had in his grandfather's estate.
Since Riggs v. Palmer, New York courts have insisted that
"[n]o one shall be permitted to... take advantage of his own
wrong, or to ... acquire property by his own crime." 3 In spite of

its precedential value and stature as a founding case in the effect
of murder on property, however, Riggs was simple on its facts. It
was a case of pure murder for profit that implicated only the
victim's property. 4 In contrast, most killings today are not
motivated by greed, 5 complicating the application of the Riggs
principle to these cases. The issues become even more complex
when the killer is insane or acquitted, 6 or when the slayer and
t J.D. Candidate, June 2009, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2004,
College of the Holy Cross.
1 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 508-09, 22 N.E. 188, 188-89 (1889).
2 Id. at 514-15, 22 N.E. at 191.
3 Id. at 511, 22 N.E. at 190; In re Estate of Pikul, 192 A.D.2d 259, 260-61, 601
N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (1st Dep't 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 See Riggs, 115 N.Y. at 508-09, 22 N.E. at 189.
5 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MURDER & VIOLENT CRIME 231 (Eric W. Hickey ed.,
2003) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA] ("[T]he most common motivation for murder is
the offender's need to resolve feelings of inferiority by exercising control and exerting
power over their victimf.").
6 See In re Estate of Alexis, 14 Misc. 3d 379, 381-82, 823 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888-89
(Sur. Ct. Nassau County 2006) (noting that the Riggs principle does not apply when
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the victim share concurrent ownership of the property. As a
result, New York courts have reached different conclusions on
how Riggs applies in these situations.
This Note focuses on issues that arise when the slayer and
the victim have concurrent ownership of property as tenants by
the entirety. Tenancy by the entirety is a unique form of
concurrent ownership because it can only be formed in real
property 7 by husband and wife 8 and cannot be unilaterally
severed or partitioned. 9 In addition, each tenant has a right of
survivorship-meaning that, during their lifetimes, each tenant
has a one-half undivided interest in the property,' 0 but upon the
natural death of one tenant, title to the entire property vests in
the survivor."
When the death is the result of murder
committed by the co-tenant, however, the survivor's interest is
uncertain. In these cases, depriving the slayer of his interest
under Riggs would not just prevent him from acquiring the
victim's property, but may also result in a forfeiture of his own
2
property interest.
Many states have legislatively addressed the implications of
murder for tenancy by the entirety, but New York law is
remarkably unsettled on the subject.
Without legislative
the killer is insane or acquitted because he has not committed a "legalo wrong").
7 Since January 1, 1996, a husband and wife may hold "shares of stock of a
cooperative apartment corporation" as tenants by the entirety. N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 6-2.2(c) (McKinney 2008).
s See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 10.02, at 121
(2000). Thirty states continue to recognize tenancy by the entirety in some form. See
Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A Transformation of Concurrent
Ownership for Modern Relationships,85 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 445-46 (2001).
9 See SPRANKLING, supra note 8, at 121. A tenancy by the entirety can only be
severed with the consent of both tenants, through, for example, the joint conveyance
of the property to a third party or through divorce. See id. The effective severance of
the tenancy creates a tenancy in common, a property interest in which both cotenants have undivided ownership of the property without the right of survivorship,
but with the individual right to transfer and partition. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET
AL., PROPERTY 275-77 (6th ed. 2006). Tenancy in common allows a co-tenant to "sell,
mortgage, lease, or otherwise transfer" his property interest, including distributing
through his will. See SPRANKLING, supra note 8, § 10.02, at 118. Each tenant in
common has the right to compel partition of the property, which can be achieved
through either physical division or apportionment of proceeds from the sale of the
property. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra, at 291.
10 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 276-77.
11 See id.
12 But see N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-b (McKinney 2008) ("A conviction of a
person for any crime, does not work a forfeiture of any property, real or personal, or
any right or interest therein.").
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guidance, the courts have muddled the law by offering conflicting
outcomes. Following Riggs, some courts have held that a killer
forfeits all property rights he would have succeeded to as a result
of his victim's death. 13 To accomplish this result, these courts
14
employed the legal fiction that the killer predeceased his victim.
By applying this legal fiction, the courts deemed the entire
property to have vested in the victim. Other courts, however,
have modified the Riggs holding and instead allowed the killer to
maintain his pre-existing interest in the property, which had
vested as a result of his crime. 15 These holdings were based on
the rationale that forcing the killer to surrender his pre-existing
interest in property would constitute punishment exceeding that
specified by law. 16 This principle, coupled with New York Civil
Rights Law section 79-b, which codifies the law against
forfeiture, provides the basis for courts that swear allegiance to
Riggs' ruling, but still grant the killer some interest in the
property. 17
These opposing standards create uncertainty and inequity
within the courts. A husband convicted of killing his wife may be
forced to forfeit the marital home under the holding of one court,
while in another court the same killer would have maintained his
property interest. Similar confusion among the courts prompted
the New York legislature to enact Estates, Powers, and Trusts
Law ("EPTL") section 4-1.6 to harmonize the law regarding the

13 See In re Estate of Pikul, 192 A.D.2d 259, 264, 601 N.Y.S.2d 113, 116 (1st
Dep't 1993); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 A.D. 87, 90, 279 N.Y.S. 176, 179 (4th Dep't
1935); In re Estates of Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d 233, 240, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797, 804 (Sur. Ct.
Bronx County 1975); In re Estate of Sparks, 172 Misc. 642, 646, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926,
931 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1939); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 456, 459, 169
N.Y.S. 173, 173, 175 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1918).
14 See Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d at 238, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801-02; Sparks, 172 Misc. at
646, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
15 See In re Estate of Mathew, 270 A.D.2d 416, 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (2d
Dep't 2000); In re Estate of Nicpon, 102 Misc. 2d 619, 621, 424 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101-02
(Sur. Ct. Erie County 1980); In re Estate of Busacca, 102 Misc. 2d 567, 568-69, 423
N.Y.S.2d 622, 623-24 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1980); In re Hawkins' Estate, 213
N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1961).
16 See, e.g., Mathew, 270 A.D.2d at 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 433. But see Riggs v.
Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 513-14, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889) (arguing that there is no
greater punishment because the rule simply prevents acquisition of property as a
result of the crime); Sparks, 172 Misc. at 646, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (noting that the
court is not taking property from the killer because it was not his to begin with).
17 See Mathew, 270 A.D.2d at 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
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distribution of joint bank accounts when one spouse killed the
other.' 8 It is again time for the legislature to take action.
In enacting legislation, the New York legislature has five
options.
First, the legislature can heed the advice of the
Surrogate's Court Advisory Committee and adopt proposed
statute EPTL section 4-1.7, which was modeled after EPTL
section 4-1.6 and would allow the killer to receive up to one-half
of the value of a life estate in property held in tenancy by the
entirety. 19 Second, the legislature can model the law on the
Uniform Probate Code ("UPC"), which provides that when one
tenant by the entirety is killed by the other, the estate is severed,
20
and each party is vested with an interest as tenant in common.
Finally, the legislature can codify any of the three different
21
approaches found within New York case law.
18 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney 2008). Joint bank
accounts are a type of joint tenancy, which is a common form of concurrent
ownership. Like tenants by the entirety, joint tenants enjoy a right of survivorship.
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 276-77. The two forms of ownership,
however, are distinctly different because a joint tenancy can be unilaterally severed
through the independent action of one co-tenant. See SPRANKLING, supra note 8,
§ 10.02, at 119-21. When a joint tenancy is validly severed, a tenancy in common is
formed. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 276. As a result, the law is well settled
on the effect of murder on joint tenancy: The murder of one joint tenant by the other
is a unilateral action resulting in the valid severance of the property and the
creation of a tenancy in common. See SPRANKLING, supra note 8, § 10.02, at 118.
EPTL section 4-1.6 alters this general rule with respect to bank accounts by limiting
the killer's property rights to his monetary contributions into the account, instead of
dividing the funds into equal tenancies in common.
19 REPORT OF THE SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 31-33 (2007),
[hereinafter
SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT],
http://
www.nycourts.gov/ip/judiciaryslegislative/SurrogatesCourtAd_07.pdf.
Under EPTL
section 4-1.6, the killer is limited to one-half of the total funds in the account even if
he contributed all of the funds because, when a joint account is created, there is a
presumption that a gift of one-half of the money contributed is given to the cotenant. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 289. EPTL section 4-1.6 is inapplicable
to tenancy by the entirety, because by its terms, the statute applies to joint
tenancies, and not to tenancies by the entirety. Moreover, because tenancy by the
entirety vastly differs from joint tenancy, the statute's provisions do not provide the
best means for determining the effect murder has on tenancy by the entirety. See
infra Part IV.A.2.
20 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(c)(2) (1990) (amended 1997).
21 See Mathew, 270 A.D.2d at 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 433 (holding that the killer
be given the commuted value of a one-half life estate); In re Estate of Nicpon, 102
Misc. 2d 619, 621, 424 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1980) (holding that
the killer was to receive a life estate in the property); In re Estates of Pinnock, 83
Misc. 2d 233, 238, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797, 802 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1975) (holding that
the killer was denied all rights in the property).
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This Note argues that .despite the claims of the courts, New
York case law is not settled on the disposition of property held as
tenancy by the entirety when one spouse murders the other.
Because of the uncertainty that results from such variations, the
legislature must take action. This Note will urge the legislature
to find a balance between the ruling in Riggs and the principle
that a killer cannot forfeit his rights. Part I of this Note will
survey and present the five available options to determine a
killer's interest in property once held in tenancy by the entirety
with his victim. Part II will discuss the need for clarification by
the legislature, while Part III will first consider the advantages
and disadvantages of the four rejected options and then evaluate
the benefits and weaknesses of the most viable approach.
Finally, Part IV advocates for codification of the line of New York
cases that grants the killer the commuted value of a one-half life
estate in the property and demonstrates this option's superiority.
I.

THE FIVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE KILLER'S PROPERTY
INTEREST

Martin Foster married Margaret Jones, and together they
purchased a home in Rochester, New York as tenants by the
entirety.
After ten years of marriage, Martin, thirty-five,
murdered his bride and immediately committed suicide.
Litigation to determine the rightful owner of the home was
brought by the heirs of both the victim and killer. 22 Martin
Foster's property rights in the Rochester home depend on which
one of the five options is applied by the courts.
The divergence in New York case law regarding the effect of
murder on tenancy by the entirety is a result of the tension
between the 1889 New York Court of Appeals' holding in Riggs,
23
announcing that a killer may not profit from his wrongdoing,
and New York Civil Rights Law section 79-b, which prevents the
forfeiture of property following a conviction. 24 As a result, there
are three outcomes embraced by New York courts when
determining the rights of a killer in property held by the killer
and his victim in tenancy by the entirety: (1) the killer is denied
22 This hypothetical is based on the facts set forth in Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103
Misc. 455, 456, 169 N.Y.S. 173, 173 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1918), and will be used
to illustrate the different results throughout the Note.
23 See Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889).
24 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-b (McKinney 2008).
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all interest in the property and it passes through the victim's
26
estate; 25 (2) the killer retains a life estate in the entire property;
and (3) the killer is denied his right of survivorship, but is
entitled to the commuted value of a one-half life estate in the
property or the proceeds from its sale. 2 7 Alternative resolutions
to the issue have been offered by the Surrogate's Court Advisory
Committee and the Uniform Probate Code. The Surrogate's
Court Advisory Committee suggests a law that would
compensate the killer for his contribution to the value of the
property up to one-half.28 The Uniform Probate Code, on the
other hand, severs the tenancy by the entirety and creates a
tenancy in common with each party maintaining an undivided
one-half interest in the property. 29 Therefore, Martin Foster's
property interest, if any, varies based on which scheme is
applied.
A.

New York Case Law Approaches-Three Distinct Outcomes

1.

The Killer Is Denied All Property Rights
The first approach used by New York courts is to preclude
the killer from taking any interest in the tenancy and vest the
property as a whole with the victim's estate.3 0 These courts
strictly adhere to the principle expressed in Riggs that a killer
may not benefit from his crime, 3 1 and assert that as a matter of
32
equity, the killer should be denied all interest in the property.

25

See, e.g., In re Estate of Pikul, 192 A.D.2d 259, 260-61, 601 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114

(1st Dep't 1993); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 A.D. 87, 90, 279 N.Y.S. 176, 179 (4th
Dep't 1935); Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d at 238, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 802; In re Estate of Sparks,
172 Misc. 642, 643, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1939).
26 See Nicpon, 102 Misc. 2d at 621, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
27 See In re Estate of Mathew, 270 A.D.2d 416, 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (2d
Dep't 2000); In re Estate of Busacca, 102 Misc. 2d 567, 569, 423 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624
(Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1980).
28

See SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 19, at

32-33.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(c)(2) (1990) (amended 1997).
See Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d at 238, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 802; Van Alstyne v. Tuffy,
103 Misc. 455, 457, 169 N.Y.S. 173, 173-74 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1918).
31 See Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889).
32 See In re Estate of Pikul, 192 A.D.2d 259, 260-61, 601 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (1st
Dep't 1993); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 A.D. 87, 90, 279 N.Y.S. 176, 179 (4th Dep't
1935); Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d at 238, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 802; In re Estate of Sparks, 172
Misc. 642, 643, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1939).
29

30
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Therefore, Martin Foster would have no interest in the couple's
Rochester home.
These courts acknowledge the distinct nature of a tenancy by
the entirety and apply equitable principles to prevent the killer
from benefiting. Prior to the crime, each tenant owned a one-half
33
undivided interest in the property with a right of survivorship.
The killer, therefore, enjoyed only the possibility of absolute
ownership, provided he outlived his spouse, but had no right to
unilaterally destroy his wife's right of survivorship.3 4 The
victim's death at her husband's hand eliminates any chance for
her to survive him, terminating her right of survivorship.
Granting the killer an undivided interest in the whole would
"elevate the nature of his ownership" interest, 35 allowing him to
benefit as a result of his crime.3 6
Even when the killer
subsequently commits suicide, he would still benefit from his
crime because, despite his inability to physically enjoy the
property, he would have the right to determine how the property
was disposed, a right considered to be one of the most
fundamental rights in the American system of private
ownership. 37 Therefore, when a killer murders his co-tenant by
the entirety, he is wrongfully terminating his victim's right to
convey her property and usurping that right for himself, again
profiting from his crime. The Riggs principle, then, intercedes
regardless of whether the killer is dead or alive, to deny the killer
of his right of survivorship and all interest in the property.3 8
This is achieved by engaging in the legal fiction that the victim
outlived her killer. 39 As a result, the property as a whole is
vested in the victim and passes into her estate to be distributed
according to her will or the laws of intestacy.
When this analysis is applied to the Fosters, the couple's
home in Rochester becomes a part of Margaret's estate.

33 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 276-77.

See Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d at 237-38, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801-02.
Id. at 237, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
See Bierbrauer,244 A.D. at 90, 279 N.Y.S. at 179.
37 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) ("[T]he right to pass on
property-to one's [heirs]-has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since
feudal times.").
38 See Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d at 237-38, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801-02; In re Estate of
Sparks, 172 Misc. 642, 646, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 931 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1939).
39 See Bierbrauer,244 A.D. at 89-90, 279 N.Y.S. at 179; Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d at
237-38, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801-02.
34
35
36
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Traditionally, when one spouse dies before the other, the
surviving spouse would be vested with an interest in the property
as a whole based on the rules . governing tenancy by the
entirety. 40 In this case, however, because of his wrongdoing,
Martin is prevented from benefiting from his crime and is
deemed to have predeceased Margaret. Therefore, he is stripped
of his right of survivorship and denied all of his ownership rights
41
in accordance with the Riggs principle.
This outcome is supported by the decisions in Van Alstyne v.
Tuffy 42 and In re Estates of Pinnock,43 in which the real estate
was vested in the victim's estate, and the killer was barred from
taking any interest in the property. 44 In Van Alstyne, the court
stressed that equity will intervene "where the natural and direct
consequence of a criminal act is to vest property in the
criminal."45 Generally, the death of one tenant by the entirety
results in the transfer of the tenancy as a whole to the surviving
spouse, but when the death occurs as a result of murder, the
Riggs principle prevents the killer from inheriting the property; a
judgment otherwise would be contrary to New York case law and
public policy. 46 Similarly, in In re Estates of Pinnock, the court
entertained the legal fiction that the killer predeceased the
victim in order to prevent the killer from gaining title to the
tenancy.4 7
Granville and Enid Pinnock, husband and wife,
40

See SPRANKLING, supra note 8, § 10.02, at 121-22.

41 Note that this was the court's holding in Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, the case upon

which these facts are based. 103 Misc. 455, 457, 169 N.Y.S. 173, 173-74 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1918).
42 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173.
43 83 Misc. 2d 233, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797.
44 See id. at 237-38, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801-02; Van Alstyne, 103 Misc. at 457, 459,
169 N.Y.S. at 173, 175; see also In re Estate of Pikul, 192 A.D.2d 259, 260-261, 264,
601 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114, 116 (1st Dep't 1993); Bierbrauer, 244 A.D. at 90, 279 N.Y.S.
at 179; In re Estate of Sparks, 172 Misc. 642, 646, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 931 (Sur. Ct.
N.Y. County 1939). Bierbrauer is particularly reinforcing because the court invoked
equitable principles to prevent a killer from benefiting from his crime and precluded
the killer from taking any interest in jointly held real estate. See 244 A.D. at 90, 279
N.Y.S. at 179. This is significant because the nature of the joint tenancy allows one
tenant to unilaterally sever the interest, and even murder is considered a feasible
means of severance. See SPRANKLING, supra note 8, § 10.02, at 118. Because
severance creates a tenancy in common, the killer would traditionally be vested with
an absolute one-half interest. The Bierbrauer court, however, employed the Riggs
principle to reach an equitable result. 244 A.D. at 89-90, 279 N.Y.S. at 179.
45 Van Alstyne, 103 Misc. at 459, 169 N.Y.S. at 175.
46 See id. at 459, 169 N.Y.S. at 175.
47 In re Estates of Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d 233, 238, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801-02 (Sur.

20081

MAKING A KILLING IN REAL ESTATE

1211

owned a home on Lowerre Place in Bronx, New York, as tenants
by the entirety. 48 In late January 1975, Granville strangled his
wife to death as she slept. He died twenty minutes later by
hanging himself, leaving behind a suicide note admitting to the
murder of his thirty-five year old wife. 49 The rope he used to kill
Enid rested lightly in his pocket. 50 To prevent Granville from
profiting from his crime, the court applied the Riggs doctrine
destroying Granville's right of survivorship and concluded that
51
the Bronx home vested in Enid's estate.
In order to satisfy rules of equity, the courts have adopted
This
the legal fiction that the victim outlived her killer.
analytical approach has its foundation in the New York Court of
Appeals' decision in Riggs, which set forth the principle that no
killer should benefit from his wrongdoing. 52 The result denies
the killer all property rights and endows the victim with the
entire estate.
The Killer Is Entitled to a Life Estate
The second approach used by the courts is to grant the killer
a life estate, but terminate his right of survivorship. 53 These
courts significantly rely on New York Civil Rights Law section
79-b, which prevents forfeiture of property as a result of criminal
acts. 54 Under this analysis, Martin Foster would retain an
interest in the Rochester home for the remainder of his life; upon
his death, the estate would be distributed according to
Margaret's will.
The focus of this rationale is on the killer's rights in the
property prior to the crime. Through the creation of a tenancy by
the entirety, the killer owned an undivided one-half life interest
in the property; he simultaneously possessed the whole with his
victim. 55 While the killer's title cannot be improved, it also may
2.

Ct. Bronx County 1975).
48 Id. at 235, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51

at 235-36, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 800-01.

Id. at 237-38, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801-02.

Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889).
See generally In re Estate of Nicpon, 102 Misc. 2d 619, 424 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Sur.
Ct. Erie County 1980) (holding that a husband convicted of killing his wife does not
forfeit the property, but instead receives only a life estate in the property).
54 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-b (McKinney 2008).
55 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 277.
52

53
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not be reduced, because the killer will be forced to sacrifice his
56
property rights in violation of Civil Rights Law section 79-b.
Since Martin Foster was entitled to use and enjoy the entire
property that he held with Margaret as tenants by the entirety,
after he killed her, he could not be divested of these rights. Upon
Margaret's death, Martin would be vested with a life estate in
the whole but denied survivorship rights to prevent him from
increasing his property interest. He would not profit from his
crime because he would be precluded from determining how the
property would be distributed upon his death-a life estate
terminates upon the death of the life tenant. The right to
determine distribution would pass to Margaret, whose estate
would take title to the property upon Martin's death.
Unfortunately for Martin, his life estate terminated the moment
he committed suicide.
This conclusion was espoused in In re Estate of Nicpon, when
the court held that absolute title in the tenancy passed through
the victim's estate, but the killer continued to maintain a life
estate. 57
Adam Nicpon killed his wife, pled guilty to
manslaughter in the First Degree, and was sentenced to jail. The
court stated that Adam "may not inherit or succeed to property
as a result of his own wrongful act," and therefore, was denied
his right of survivorship in the home held in tenancy by the
entirety. 58 Emphasizing that Adam was still alive, unlike the
killer in In re Estates of Pinnock, the court held that Adam was
entitled to a life estate in the property.5 9 The court reasoned that
denying Adam an interest in the property would amount to
forfeiture in violation of the Civil Rights Law. 60 Adam, therefore,
maintained a life estate until his death, at which time, the
property would be distributed according to his wife's will.
3.

The Killer Retains the Value of a One-Half Life Estate

The third approach used by New York courts is to grant the
killer the commuted value of a one-half life estate in the
property, and deny him his right of survivorship. 61 This analysis

56

See Nicpon, 102 Misc. 2d at 621, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02.

57 Id. at 621, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 102.

58 Id. at 620-21, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02.
59 Id.
60

Id. at 621, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02.

61

See generally In re Estate of Mathew, 270 A.D.2d 416, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d

2008]

MAKING A KILLING IN REAL ESTATE

1213

balances the Riggs principle with the killer's right against
forfeiture. As a result, Martin Foster would receive a lump-sum
payment equal to the value of a one-half life estate in the
Rochester home, factoring in his life expectancy. Title in the
property would pass to Margaret's heirs.
The basis of this approach is an equilibrium between the rule
set out in Riggs and the law against forfeiture. The courts
recognize that each tenant by the entirety "is entitled to one-half
of the rents and profits" earned by the property during their
lifetime. 62 To prevent the killer from benefiting, he is denied his
right of survivorship, but to avoid forfeiture, the court holds that
the killer is entitled to proceeds equivalent to the revenue
created by one-half of the property. 63 Therefore, Martin Foster is
entitled to the commuted value of one-half of the Rochester
property limited by his life expectancy, and the remainder is
distributed to his victim's heirs. Since Martin died immediately
after Margaret, however, the value of his award is determined by
64
his actual life span and his interest is essentially zero.
This approach was applied in In re Estate of Busacca, when
the court granted the killer the "commuted value of a life estate
in one-half' of the property for his life expectancy. 65 In In re
Estate of Busacca, Thomas Busacca killed his wife Florence. The
couple's home was sold, and the court was determining the extent
of Thomas' rights in the proceeds from the sale. 66 After reciting
the rule set out in Riggs, the court held that Thomas was entitled
to the value of a one-half life estate in the tenancy so that New

Dep't 2000); In re Estate of Busacca, 102 Misc. 2d 567, 423 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sur. Ct.
Nassau County 1980).
62 Busacca, 102 Misc. 2d at 568, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
63 Id.
at 569, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 624. It is interesting that the victim may be
deemed to have survived her killer with respect to the right of survivorship, vesting

her estate with fee simple absolute, but, in order to prevent forfeiture, the killer may
not be considered to have predeceased his victim. Although, in cases of murdersuicide, engaging in the legal fiction that the killer predeceased would create a
rational result, the rule cannot be applied uniformly to all factual situations,
particularly when the killer lives. To deem the killer predeceased directly
contradicts the very fact that he is alive.
64 See Estate of Veronica Barraza, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 2002, at 26, col. 6 (Sur.
Ct. Nassau County) (noting that when the killer is already deceased his life
expectancy is certain, and therefore, computations should be based on his actual life
span).
65 102 Misc. 2d at 569, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
66 Id. at 568, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
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York Civil Rights Law section 79-b would not be violated. 67 By
upholding the killer's right not to forfeit and simultaneously
implementing the principle that the wrongdoer may not profit
from his crime, the Busacca court created a very equitable
remedy.
This compromise between Riggs and the Civil Rights Law
was reiterated in In re Estate of Mathew when the killer-who
held property with his victim as tenants by the entirety-was
awarded the "value of a life estate in one-half of the property or
the proceeds from its sale." 68 In In re Estate of Mathew, Thomas
Mathew killed his wife Mary and was subsequently convicted for
the crime. 69 The Mathew's Rockland County home was sold and
Thomas claimed a share in the proceeds. 70 Noting that "an
individual who kills his ... spouse is not entitled to succeed to
sole ownership of real property as a surviving tenant by the
entirety," but neither may "the slayer ... forfeit his ... own
undivided interest in [the] property," the court held that Thomas
was "entitled to the commuted value of a life estate in one-half of
the property or the proceeds from its sale." 71 This value is
calculated based on his life expectancy and he forfeits the
remainder.
The killer's life interest is a valuation computed based on
actuarial tables. Factoring in life expectancy and interest rates,
the actuarial table derives a percentage factor used to determine
the remainder interest. 72 The percentage factor for the life estate
is determined by subtracting the remainder interest factor from
the number one. 73 The killer's interest-the commuted value of a
one-half life estate-is equal to this life estate factor multiplied
by the property value and divided in half,74 where the property
value is determined by an appraisal or the amount of proceeds
from its sale. For example, in In re Estate of Mathew, the
Mathew's Rockland County home was sold with proceeds totaling

67 Id. at 569, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
68 270 A.D.2d 416, 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (2d Dep't 2000).
69 Id. at 416, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
70

Id.

71 Id. at 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
72 See 26 C.F.R. § 25.2512-5(d)(2)(iii) (2008) (Treasury regulation regarding
estate tax computation).
73 Id.
74 See Margaret Valentine Turano, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney Supp. 2007).
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approximately $64,000. 75 Assuming a five percent interest rate
and that Thomas Mathew was sixty years old at the time of the
crime, the remainder interest factor is 0.40624.76 By subtracting
this number from the number one, the life estate factor is
0.59376. 77 This factor is multiplied by the sale proceeds$64,000-resulting in the value of $38,000.64.78 Because Thomas
is only entitled to a one-half life estate, this amount is divided in
half and the value of Thomas' one-half life estate equals
79
$19,000.32.
B.

The Surrogate'sCourt Advisory Committee Approach

The fourth approach, announced by the Surrogate's Court
Advisory Committee's Report, entitles the killer to the value of
his contribution toward the property, limited to one-half the
value of a life estate in the tenancy.8 0 This provision mirrors the
recently adopted EPTL section 4-1.6, which streamlined the New
York courts' approach to the effect of murder on joint bank
accounts.8 ' According to the proposed law, Martin Foster would
75 See In re Estate of Mathew, 270 A.D.2d 416, 416, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (2d
Dep't 2000).
76

26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-7(d)(7) tbl.S (2008).

77 1.00000 - 0.40624 = 0.59376.
78 0.59376 x $64,000 = $38,000.64.
79 $38,000.64 2 = $19,000.32.
80 See SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 19, at
32-33. The proposed amendment reads:
§ 4-1.7. Disqualification of tenant by the entirety in certain instances.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a tenant by the
entirety in real property ... who is convicted of murder in the second
degree as defined in section 125.25 of the penal law, or murder in the first
degree as defined in section 125.27 of the penal law, or manslaughter in the
first degree as defined in subdivision one or two of section 125.20 of the
penal law or manslaughter in the second degree as defined in subdivision
one of section 125.15 of the penal law of the other spouse, shall not be
entitled to any share in such real property or monies derived therefrom,
except for any fractional portion thereof contributed by the convicted
spouse from his or her separate property as defined by paragraph d of
subdivision one of part B of section two hundred thirty-six of the domestic
relations law, except that such convicted spouse shall not be entitled to
more than the value of a life estate in one-half of such property held as
tenant by the entirety or monies derived therefrom.
Id. Note that this language is very similar to the recently adopted EPTL section
4-1.6.
81 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney 2008). The statute states
in part that:
[A] joint tenant convicted of murder in the second degree as defined in
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be able to recover the value of his endowment to the tenancy,
provided it did not exceed the value of one-half the life estate.
The joint bank account statute was interpreted in In re
Kiejliches, when the court limited the access of the killer to the
funds held in a joint bank account.8 2 In In re Kiejliches, Elena
Kiejliches was responsible for the death of her husband, Boris,
83
who was found in a barrel on the shores of Queens, New York.
During their marriage, Elena and Boris created a joint bank
account. At the time of Boris' death, the account contained
approximately one million dollars.8 4 The court held that Elena
was entitled only to those funds that "she actually contributed to
the account."8 5 Similar to the purpose of the Surrogate's Court
Advisory Committee's proposed statute, the rational basis for
this outcome is rooted in the principle that a killer may not profit
from his crime, but neither may he forfeit as a result.8 6 The goal
is to ensure that the killer is reimbursed for his contribution to
prevent forfeiture, but at the same time, limited to no more than
one-half-his interest prior to the crime.
The Advisory Committee's proposal would have a similar
effect as the joint bank account statute. If the Foster's Rochester
home was appraised at $100,000 and Martin paid one-half of the
purchase price, he would be entitled to one-half of the property's
value in return.8 7 If Martin had paid the entire purchase price,
he would not be fully compensated, but instead limited to onehalf of its value. If, however, Martin did not contribute anything
to the value of the tenancy, he would be entitled to nothing. The
Committee views this as an equitable result because the killer is
not profiting from his crime, but only recovering his initial
section 125.25 of the penal law or murder in the first degree as defined in
section 125.27 of the penal law of another joint tenant shall not be entitled
to the distribution of any monies in a joint bank account created or
contributed to by the deceased joint tenant, except for those monies
contributed by the convicted joint tenant.
Id.
82

292 A.D.2d 530, 531-32, 740 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86-87 (2d Dep't 2002).

88 Id. at 530-31, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 86.

Id. at 530, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
Id. at 531, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 86. Unfortunately, the courts have not addressed
whether the killer is also entitled to the interest that has accumulated on those
individually deposited funds.
86 See In re Estates of Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d 233, 237, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801
(Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1975).
87 Note that because Martin committed suicide, his $50,000 would be deposited
with his estate and distributed according to his will.
84
85
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investment. The killer is not forfeiting either because, during the
tenancy, he was only entitled to an undivided one-half in the
property.
C.

The Uniform Probate Code Model

The fifth approach, outlined in the Uniform Probate Code's
slayer statute, section 2-803, severs the tenancy by the entirety
88
and the killer and his victim become tenants in common.
Under this approach, the right of survivorship is destroyed and
both Martin and Margaret Foster are entitled to an undivided
one-half interest in the Rochester property. As a result of her
death, Margaret's half of the property will be distributed
according to her will or the laws of intestacy, but Martin is free to
possess, enjoy, and exercise his rights as a tenant in common.
The underlying purpose of the Code provision is to prevent
the killer from profiting from his crime, but also to prevent him
from forfeiting his property. 89 This rationale was adopted by the
Florida legislature and infused into the state's slayer statute,
section 732.802, which was modeled after the Uniform Probate
Code.90 Like the UPC, the Florida statute provides that the
killing of one tenant by the entirety by the other severs the
tenancy, creating a tenancy in common. 91 This interpretation
was supported in Capoccia v. Capoccia,92 where the Florida
District Court of Appeals held that, under the statute, a killer is
precluded from obtaining any interest as a surviving spouse, and
instead, is vested with a one-half interest as a tenant in
common. 93 In Capoccia, Bobbie Jean Capoccia murdered her
husband, Santo, and litigation arose to determine the rights of
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(c)(2) (1990) (amended 1997).
89 See id. § 2-803 cmt. (Supp. 2007).
90 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 note (West 2008) (Uniform Law).
91 See id. § 732.802(2). The statute provides that:
Any joint tenant who unlawfully and intentionally kills another joint
tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the
share of the decedent passes as the decedent's property and the killer has
no rights by survivorship. This provision applies to joint tenancies with
right of survivorship and tenancies by the entirety in real and personal
property; joint and multiple-party accounts in banks, savings and loan
associations, credit unions, and other institutions; and any other form of
coownership with survivorship incidents.
88

Id.
92

505 So. 2d 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).

93 Id. at 625
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the killer in the estate held by her and her husband as tenants
by the entirety. 94 Noting that the statute sought to prevent the
murderer froin taking the whole of the property by operation of
the tenancy by the entirety, the court terminated Bobbie Jean's
right of survivorship. 95 The court held that under the statute,
the tenancy by the entirety is severed and transformed into a
tenancy in common with the killer and victim each taking a onehalf interest. 96 The language used in the UPC would lead to the
same result-severance of the tenancy by the entirety forming a
tenancy in common. Therefore, under the UPC or the Florida
statute, Martin and Margaret Foster's tenancy by the entirety
would be severed and the killer and victim would each be given
equal shares as tenants in common.
II.

THE NEED FOR AND PURPOSES OF REFORM

The division within New York case law continues despite the
New York Court of Appeals' recent decision in In re Estates of
Covert,97 and because the legislature has failed to enact any
legislation clarifying the law. The Court did not resolve the
controversy in In re Estates of Covert because the holding was
limited to the facts of the case-which involved a joint will-and
the particular issue-which addressed whether the killer's family
was precluded from taking under the victim's will.98 There
remain, then, three different common law approaches and two
statutory suggestions on how to resolve the effect of murder on
tenancy by the entirety. 99 This wide variety of results creates
inconsistency within property law, 100 unreliability in the transfer
of property, and it wastes judicial resources. 10 1 As a traditionally
common law state, New York's rule has developed through case
law 10 2 with seemingly little need for legislation, because the
94

Id.

95 Id.
96 Id.

97 N.Y.2d 68, 761 N.E.2d 571, 735 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2001).
c9 Id. at 72, 761 N.E.2d at 573-74, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 881-82.
99 See supra Part I.
100 See Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889) (noting that
the transfer of property should be "orderly, peaceable, and just").
101 See, e.g., Covert, 97 N.Y.2d at 73, 761 N.E.2d at 574, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 882
(noting the procedural history of the case, which spanned three courts).
102 See Julie J. Olenn, Comment, 'Til Death Do Us Part:New York's Slayer Rule
and In re Estates of Covert, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (2001). One of the limited
exceptions in this area was the amendment to the Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law
97
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Riggs principle was considered to comprehensively address all of
the issues. 10 3 Since, however, application of the rule has lead to
significant inconsistencies causing the courts themselves to call
for legislative action, 0 4 the New York legislature must act to
address the confusion, uncertainty, and inefficiency that the
conflict creates.10 5 The legislature should enact a statutory
provision clarifying this area of law because a statute will
(1) create reliability; (2) promote economy and judicial efficiency;
and (3) relieve the judiciary of the task of legislating from the
bench.
A.

The Impact of In re Estates of Covert

The division among New York courts' approaches to
succession of rights to property held in tenancy by the entirety
when one spouse kills the other was specifically noted by the
Appellate Division in In re Estates of Covert.10 6 Unfortunately,
the split remains unresolved because the Court of Appeals chose
not to comprehensively address the issue in its opinion.
In re Estates of Covert was unique on its facts because it
involved the distribution of joint property under a joint will that
had been executed by the killer and his victim prior to the
crime. 10 7 In addition, the court had to decide whether the killer's
family, not whether the killer himself, was precluded from taking
property from the victim's estate. 0 8 As husband and wife,
to include a statute dictating the rights of a killer in assets held in a joint bank
account with his victim. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney
2008).
103 See Olenn, supra note 102, at 1347 n.28 ("New York has failed to enact a
comprehensive

slayer

statute ... because

Riggs

found

such

legislation

unnecessary .... ).
104 See In re Estate of Dorsey, 161 Misc. 2d 258, 262-63, 613 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338
(Sur. Ct. Duchess County 1994) ("[1]t seems quite apparent that a comprehensive
statute on the subject would provide the best guidance to a court .... ).
105 See John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A
Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715, 721 (1936) ("[T]he most satisfactory
solution of the problem of preventing a slayer from profiting by his unlawful act is
statutory ....).
106 279 A.D.2d 48, 51 n.1, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 n.1 (3d Dep't 2000) ("We note a
divergence of appellate authority on this point, with the First and the Fourth
Departments holding that the wrongdoer forfeits all rights and the Second
Department holding that the wrongdoer does not forfeit his or her own undivided
interest." (citations omitted)), af'd, 97 N.Y.2d 68, 761 N.E.2d 571, 735 N.Y.S.2d 879
(2001).
107 See Covert, 97 N.Y.2d at 72-73, 761 N.E.2d at 574, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
10 Id. at 72, 761 N.E.2d at 573-74, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 881-82.
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Edward and Kathleen Covert executed a joint will disposing of
their property in equal parts to Edward's family, Kathleen's
family, and Kathleen's siblings. Three years later, Edward shot
and killed Kathleen, and then committed suicide. 10 9 Kathleen's
family sought to prevent Edward's family, the Coverts, from
receiving Kathleen's personal property and the couple's joint
property under the joint will. 110
The court recognized the tension between the principles set
out in Riggs and the public policy codified in the Civil Rights Law
section 79-b, 1 ' but still held that Riggs disqualified Edward from
taking under Kathleen's will as a result of his crime. 1 2 However,
the Coverts were still entitled to their share of the property,
because under the joint will, they were designated beneficiaries
of Kathleen's estate. 113 Edward's crime did not preclude his
innocent family members from benefiting under the will. With
respect to the couple's joint property, the court held that Edward
was entitled to a one-half interest in the property because prior
to the killing, he had a vested interest with the right to take onehalf of the joint property. Denying him his interest would
amount to forfeiture." 4 By applying Riggs, however, the court
denied Edward the right of survivorship because of his crime and
the joint property passed in equal halves to the two estates. 1 5
Unfortunately, the court's ruling does not address property
held in tenancy by the entirety.1 16 The holding fails to resolve
109 Id. at 72-73, 761 N.E.2d at 574, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 882. The property at issue
included Kathleen's personal estate estimated to be worth $225,000, Edward's assets
worth $71,000, and property held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship valued
at $121,000. Id. at 73, 75, 761 N.E.2d at 574, 576, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 882, 884.
110Id. at 73, 761 N.E.2d at 574, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
111 Id. at 74, 761 N.E.2d at 575, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 883 ("Indeed, public policy, as
embodied in Civil Rights Law § 79-b, militates against application of Riggs as a
means of effecting a proprietary forfeiture.").
112

Id.

Id. at 74-75, 761 N.E.2d at 575-76, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 883-84.
Id. at 75-76, 761 N.E.2d at 576, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 884. Note that this is
consistent with the property principle that murder severs the joint tenancy and
creates a tenancy in common. See SPRANKLING, supra note 8, § 10.02, at 118.
115 Covert, 97 N.Y.2d at 76, 761 N.E.2d at 576, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
116 Id. at 75, 761 N.E.2d at 576, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 884 ("This appeal centers on
three main types of property to be distributed-individual property owned outright
and independently by Edward and Kathleen respectively, joint property with a right
of survivorship and individual assets with named beneficiaries."). Although a joint
tenancy and tenancy by the entirety have similar characteristics, tenancy by the
entirety is unique in that it can only be created in a married couple and there is no
unilateral right of partition. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 276-77.
113
114
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the tenancy by the entirety issue because the court's focus was on
the application of the Riggs principle to will bequests and joint
tenancies, 117 and whether Riggs prevented a killer's family, who
were also distributees of the victim's will, from accepting their
testamentary gifts.' 18 As recognized by the Appellate Division in
In re Estates of Covert, New York case law is divided on the
status of a killer's interest in property once held by the killer and
his victim as tenants by the entirety." 9 Because the law
continues to be divided, it is the role of the legislature to pass
statutory provisions to create harmony.
B.

Functionsof Reform

1.

Reliability

The divergence in case law has created uncertainty in the
devolution of real property. The state of New York has become
geographically divided, and a killer's rights now depend on the
county in which he committed his crime; 120 his property interest
varies with his location. 12' It is inherently unfair for a killer in
one county to maintain greater property rights after killing his
spouse strictly because of where he committed the killing. This
creates an irrational result in an area of law that should be
See Covert, 97 N.Y.2d at 73-74, 761 N.E.2d at 575, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
Id. at 72, 761 N.E.2d at 573-74, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 881-82.
119 See In re Estates of Covert, 279 A.D.2d 48, 51 n.1, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 n.1
(3d Dep't 2000), aff'd, 97 N.Y.2d 68, 761 N.E.2d 571, 735 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2001).
120 See id. (noting a split in authority with the First and Fourth Departments
limiting all rights of the killer and the Second Department granting the killer a life
estate).
121 The Appellate Division is divided into four departments largely based on
region. The First Department includes Manhattan and the Bronx. The second
Department includes the remaining three boroughs, Nassau and Suffolk Counties,
and includes Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, and Westchester Counties. The Third
Department encompasses the area from Albany to Binghamton and just east of
Syracuse. The Fourth Department consists of the area west of the Third
Department, beginning with Syracuse and including Rochester and Buffalo. See New
York State Unified Court System, Appellate Divisions, http://www.courts.
state.ny.us/courts/appellatedivisions.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). Note that
Citibank v. Goldberg, 178 Misc. 2d 287, 291, 679 N.Y.S.2d 237, 240 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1998), was decided by a court sitting in Nassau County, within the
jurisdiction of the Second Department, and held that the killer had no interest in the
proceeds from the sale of property held as tenancy by the entirety. Two years later,
however, in In re Estate of Mathew, 270 A.D.2d 416, 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (2d
Dep't 2000), the Appellate Division, Second Department, found the decision in
Citibank "inconsistent with the decision of this court."
117
118
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uniform and precise. 122 In fact, the very purpose of probate law is
to provide for an efficient and orderly devolution of property upon
death. 123 It is important, then, to have a clear and well-settled
law that can be relied upon to eliminate this disturbance and
restore certainty and uniformity in this complex area of law.
2.

Efficiency

Currently, the legal issues that arise as a result of one
tenant by the entirety killing the other can only be resolved by
the courts. The victim's estate is forced to petition the courts for
direction to resolve these issues. 124 This often requires an appeal
that could reach the Court of Appeals, even further consuming
judicial resources. 125 In addition, excessive litigation forces a
grieving family to incur great monetary expenses to fight for a
judicial declaration that could easily be determined by the
legislature. Having a single authority that announces the rule of
law would free the courts from incessant petitions for direction
and guidance, reduce costs for the victim's estate, and allow the
property at issue to pass naturally; a clearly written law fulfills
all of these purposes by enforcing efficient and "predictable"
property transfer. 126
Legislative action, then, would limit
wasteful litigation and reduce economic waste.
3.

Eliminating Judicial Legislation

The lack of direction from the legislature has caused the
courts to use their discretion to provide equitable results. As
122 See Olenn, supra note 102, at 1374 (noting that murder creates disorder in
the systematic operation of property law).
123

See Daniel A. Farber, Courts, Statutes, and Public Policy: The Case of the

Murderous Heir, 53 SMU L. REV. 31, 46 (2000) (noting that the "main purpose" of
statutes governing wills is to "provide an efficient means of property transfer at

death").
124 See, e.g., In re Estates of Covert, 97 N.Y.2d 68, 73, 761 N.E.2d 571, 574, 735
N.Y.S.2d 879, 882 (2001) (noting that executor of decedent's estate petitioned the
court for "direction in distribution of the estate"); In re Estate of Busacca, 102 Misc.
2d, 567, 568, 423 N.Y.S.2d, 622, 623 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1980) (discussing an
action to determine a killer's interest in his victim's estate).
125 See, e.g., Covert, 97 N.Y.2d at 73, 761 N.E.2d at 574-75, 735 N.Y.S.2d at
882-83 (resolving a case that began in the Surrogate's Court, was appealed to the
Appellate Division, and then heard by the New York Court of Appeals).
126 See Gregory C. Blackwell, Property: Creating a Slayer Statute Oklahomans
Can Live with, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 143, 143 (2004) (" 'It is almost as important that
property law be predictable as that it be right.'" (quoting In re Estate of Propst, 788
P.2d 628, 639 (Cal. 1990) (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting))).

2008]

MAKING A KILLING IN REAL ESTATE

1223

more cases have come before the courts to request direction on
how to cope with murder's effect on tenancy by the entirety, this
use of discretion has resulted in differing and inconsistent
decisions. 127 But even if a single rule was adopted by the courts,
it is unlikely that the rule would sufficiently anticipate all factual
situations because it would have developed from one specific set
of facts. 128
This problem could easily be preempted by a
comprehensive statute that would serve as the ultimate
authority, guiding the courts in their interpretation of the law129
130
and minimizing the need for judicial legislation.
The role of the legislature is to impart a standardized rule of
law for the benefit of both the courts and the citizens of the state.
Uniform law provides courts with the ability to efficiently and
effectively interpret and apply the law, but also informs the
people of the consequences of certain actions. 13' The legislature
must take "affirmative steps" to synchronize the law in this
32
area. 1
III. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE FIVE
PROPOSED OPTIONS

Faced with reform, the legislature has five options to rectify
the current chaos existing in the law regarding transfer of
property held in tenancy by the entirety including: (1) a statute
modeled after the Uniform Probate Code section 2-803; (2) a
statute adopting the Surrogate's Court Advisory Committee's
proposed legislation; and (3) a statute codifying one of the three
approaches used by New York courts. The new statute should
See supra Part I.
Wade, supra note 105, at 718 (questioning whether the courts "would be
able adequately to meet all of the situations which could be disposed of in a carefully
drafted statute"); see also Tara L. Pehush, Comment, Maryland Is Dying for a Slayer
Statute: The Ineffectiveness of the Common Law Slayer Rule in Maryland, 35 U.
BALT. L. REV. 271, 290 (2005) (noting that a court's analysis of one case often leaves
"unanswered questions that courts are likely to encounter in the future").
129 See Wade, supra note 105, at 718 (reasoning that by applying a statutory
provision, the courts would "reach that same result [but] by a more customary and
authoritative method").
130 See Pehush, supra note 128, at 291 (recognizing that courts are often "forced
to play a quasi-legislative role" when there is no law to address the issues before
them).
131 See id. at 290 (noting that legislative action makes both the courts and the
state's citizens "aware" of the laws).
132Id. at 291.
127

128 See
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prevent the killer from benefiting from his crime, 133 but it should
1 34
also incorporate the certainty that is inherent in property law.
Additionally, it should provide uniformity, reliability, and
efficiency, while sufficiently reducing the need for judicial
lawmaking. 35 Although each option has its own advantages and
disadvantages, ultimately, the legislature should enact a law
codifying the outcome adopted by the New York courts that
grants the killer the commuted value of a one-half life estate in
the property. This Part first considers the four options that fail
to implement reform and then analyzes the superiority of the
approach that grants the killer the value of a one-half life estate.
A.

The Four Options That Insufficiently Address the Needs for
Reform

1.

The Uniform Probate Code Model

The Uniform Probate Code's slayer statute severs the
tenancy by the entirety and grants the killer and victim equal
shares as tenants in common.1 36 Although numerous states have
adopted this approach,1 37 it has a limited foundation in New York
case law because it is more forgiving of the killer than the New
York courts.1 38 The Uniform Probate Code should not be adopted
133

See Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889).

134 See Callie Kramer, Note, Guilty by Association: Inadequacies in the Uniform

Probate Code Slayer Statute, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 697, 701-02 (2003) (noting
that "the regular disposition of property" is disrupted by unlawful killings).
135 See supra Part II.B.
136 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(c)(2) (1990) (amended 1997). Section 2803(c)(2) uses the phrase "joint tenants with the right of survivorship," which
includes tenancies by the entireties under the Uniform Probate Code. See id. § 1201(26). The pertinent text reads:
"Joint tenants with the right of survivorship" and "community property
with the right of survivorship" includes co-owners of property held under
circumstances that entitle one or more to the whole of the property on the
death of the other or others, but excludes forms of co-ownership
registration in which the underlying ownership of each party is in
proportion to that party's contribution.
Id.
137 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(B)(2) (2008) (adopting the UPC
statute in full).
138 See, for example, In re Estate of Nicpon, 102 Misc. 2d 619, 621, 424 N.Y.S.2d
100, 102 (Sur Ct. Erie County 1980), which is the most generous of the New York
court rulings, granting the killer a life estate in the property as a whole. In contrast,
see In re Estates of Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d 233, 238, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797, 802 (Sur. Ct.
Bronx County 1975), which denied the killer all rights to the property and deemed
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because it violates the Riggs principles by allowing the slayer to
benefit from his killing, neglects the distinct characteristics of
the tenancy by the entirety, and contradicts current New York
case law.
The Uniform Probate Code's slayer statute violates the Riggs
principle by transforming the tenancy by the entirety into a
tenancy in common, vesting the killer with a right greater than
his interest prior to the killing. As a tenant by the entirety, the
killer only held an undivided, one-half life interest in the
property with the possibility of outright ownership, but only if his
139
fellow tenant, who has a reciprocal right, predeceased him.
This ownership right is distinctly different from a tenancy in
common, which is characterized by fee ownership in one-half of
This unfettered vesting of one-half of the
the property. 140
property in the murderer would amount to him "profit[ing] by his
own wrong."141 Therefore, application of the Uniform Probate
Code results in the "elevat[ion]" of the killer's interest, contrary
142
to the Riggs principle.
The UPC is also inadequate because it does not differentiate
between a tenancy by the entirety and a joint tenancy. During
the existence of a tenancy by the entirety, a co-tenant cannot
unilaterally sever the tenancy and form a tenancy in common.143
This aspect distinguishes the tenancy by the entirety from the
joint tenancy, 144 but the Uniform Probate Code equates the two
distinct tenancies and allows the killer to transform a tenancy by
the entirety into a tenancy in common.1 45 In essence, the

the victim to have outlived the killer.
139See Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d at 237, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
140 Id. (noting that ownership rights as tenant by the entirety, prior to the cotenant's death, "in no respect had the attributes of absolute one-half ownership of an
undivided one-half which flows from a tenancy in common").
141 Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 A.D. 87, 89, 279 N.Y.S. 176, 179 (4th Dep't 1935).
142 Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d at 237, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
143 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 276-77.
144 See id.
145 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(c)(2) (1990) (amended 1997). But see
Olenn, supra note 102, at 1373 n.215 (arguing that a tenancy by the entirety must
be treated differently than a joint tenancy). Murder of a joint tenant severs the joint
tenancy and creates a tenancy in common. See SPRANKLING, supra note 8, § 10.02, at
118. While this might seem to provide support for the rule, it neglects the unique
quality of the tenancy by the entirety. Instead of distinguishing the tenancy by the
entirety for its unique nature, the UPC inappropriately treats it as the functional
equivalent of a joint tenancy when murder is involved.
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Uniform Probate Code allows the killer to do through his victim's
1 46
murder what he could not do during her lifetime.
Finally, the approach used by the UPC, converting the
tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common, was rejected
by a New York court in Bierbrauer v. Moran.147 In Bierbrauer,
John Moran brutally beat his wife, Nettie, and left her to die on
the bathroom floor. 148 As Nettie struggled to survive, John sat in
the couple's basement and killed himself by inhaling toxic
fumes.1 49 The court found that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that one had survived the other, but refused to apply the
simultaneous death statute to determine the appropriate
distribution of the couple's property.150 New York's simultaneous
death statute provides that when the order of death is
indeterminable, one-half of the property is distributed as if one
spouse survived and the other half is distributed as if the other
spouse had survived. 15
Essentially, the property would be
divided into a tenancy in common, and both John and Nettie's
estates would be entitled to one-half of the property. The court,
however, rejected this result, and instead, applied equitable
principles to deny John any right to the estate.' 52 The Bierbrauer
court's outright rejection of the application of the simultaneous
death statute undermines the suitability of the Uniform Probate
Code to New York law.
Since application of the Uniform Probate Code creates
results that are contrary to New York case law and that ignore
the unique characteristics of a tenancy by the entirety, the New

See § 2-803(c)(2).
244 A.D. 87, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (4th Dep't 1935).
148 Id. at 88-89, 279 N.Y.S. at 177-78.
149 Id. at 88-89, 279 N.Y.S. at 178.
150 Id. at 89-90, 279 N.Y.S. at 178-79. It should be noted
issue was real estate held in joint tenancy. Id. at 89, 279
simultaneous death statute, however, applies uniformly to
tenancies by the entirety. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
146
147

that the property at
N.Y.S. at 179. The
joint tenancies and
§ 2-1.6(c) (McKinney

2008).
151 See § 2-1.6(c). The pertinent section provides, "[w]here there is no sufficient
evidence that two joint tenants or tenants by the entirety have died otherwise than
simultaneously the property so held shall be distributed one-half as if one had
survived and one-half as if the other had survived." Id. The simultaneous death
severs the tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common and the estate of each
tenant is entitled to one-half of the property. See Bierbrauer, 244 A.D. at 90, 279
N.Y.S. at 180-81.
152 Bierbrauer,244 A.D. at 89-90, 279 N.Y.S. at 178-79.
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York legislature should not adopt a statutory provision modeled
on the Uniform Probate Code section 2-803.
2.

The Surrogate's Court Advisory Committee Approach

The Advisory Committee's proposed legislation would
compensate the killer for any contribution to the value of the
property, not to exceed one-half of the value of a life estate in the
whole property. 153 The obvious advantages of the statute are its
significant resemblance to the recently adopted EPTL section 41.6 and its noble attempt to balance Riggs with the rule against
forfeiture. Unfortunately, by limiting the killer's interest only to
what he "contributed" to the tenancy, 154 the statute disregards
the unique nature of the tenancy by the entirety and creates the
potential for forfeiture and uncertainty with respect to the
killer's ultimate interest. In addition, by failing to address cases
in which a killing has occurred but a conviction has not, the
proposed law does not eliminate the need for judicial legislation.
The emphasis of the statute is on preventing the wrongdoer
from succeeding to property as a result of his crime, but its
application creates the potential for forfeiture. Upon creation of
a tenancy by the entirety, each tenant has a one-half undivided
interest in the property as a whole. 155 If the killer gains more
than this one-half interest, he will benefit from his crime; if he
becomes entitled to less than one-half, his interest will be
forfeited.
The statute attempts to prevent the killer from
profiting by limiting his recovery to no more than one-half the
value of a life estate in the property.1 56 When the killer's
contribution was less than one-half, however, his interest is
diminished because he becomes entitled to a fractional
153

SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 19, at 33.

154

Id. The contribution must have come from the killer's "separate property."

Id. According

to the Domestic Relations Law, separate property is defined as:
(1) [P]roperty acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest,
devise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse;
(2) compensation for personal injuries; (3) property acquired in exchange
for or the increase in value of separate property, except to the extent that
such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other
spouse; (4) property described as separate property by written agreement of
the parties pursuant to subdivision three of this part.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236 (B)(1)(d) (McKinney 2008).
155 See DUKEMINIER ETAL., supra note 9, at 277.
156 See SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 19, at
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percentage, even though prior to the crime he was entitled to a
one-half interest. 157 In this sense, the statute fails to protect
against forfeiture.
The determination of the killer's interest creates confusion,
because unlike a joint bank account, contributions to the value of
a home can be more than just monetary. The value of a joint
bank account is equal to the funds deposited plus any interest
that has accumulated. The contributions of each tenant can be
easily determined by referencing bank deposit records and
computing the interest. 158 Contributions to a home, on the other
hand, cannot be calculated by simply establishing who made the
down payment; many additional factors contribute to the value of
a home. For example, improvements and routine maintenance
coritribute to a home's worth, but there is little or no way to
verify which tenant made such contributions and exactly how
much value was added.
Since non-monetary contributions
cannot be disregarded because they enhance the value of the
home, there is no way to accurately determine the killer's
interest. Therefore, this proposal not only fails to resolve the
issues of uncertainty, but also creates additional ambiguity.
This statute also fails to eliminate the need for judicial
legislation because it only applies to killers who have been
convicted of murder or manslaughter. 1 59 It disregards the effect
of murder-suicide, acquittal, or abatement on the tenancy by the
entirety-issues that the New York courts have already
confronted. 160 In such cases, the courts have held that it is
appropriate for the Surrogate's Court to determine that the killer
was criminally liable before applying equitable principles. 16' To
find liability, the Surrogate's Court must hold that the slayer was
culpable for his victim's death by a fair preponderance of the

157

158
159

32-33.
160

See id.
See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney 2008).
See SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 19, at
See, e.g., In re Estate of Pikul, 192 A.D.2d 259, 262-63, 601 N.Y.S.2d 113,

115 (1st Dep't 1993) (deciding the effect of the abatement of a killer's conviction on

the victim's property).
161 See In re Estate of Bobula, 19 N.Y.2d 818, 819, 227 N.E.2d 49, 50, 280
N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (1967) (remanding to the Surrogate's Court for a determination of
killer's criminal liability). But see id. at 820-21, 227 N.E.2d at 51, 280 N.Y.S.2d at
155 (Burke, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Surrogate's Court is not the appropriate
forum to determine criminal liability).
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evidence. 162 This is the burden of proof regardless of whether the
killer died before trial, 163 was acquitted, 64 or his conviction was
abated through operation of law. 65 In the case of abatement, a
jury's verdict is sufficient to create a presumption of the killer's
guilt; the burden then shifts to the killer's estate to challenge
that conviction on the basis of fundamental unfairness. 66 Under
these circumstances, litigable issues unresolved by the statute
would still exist requiring judicial resolution and further
burdening the courts.
Because the Advisory Committee's
proposal does not meet the goals of the necessary legislative
reform, it should not be adopted by the New York legislature.
3.

New York Case Law Denying the Killer All Property Rights
A law strictly codifying the Riggs principle would adopt the
legal fiction that the killer predeceased his victim in order to
prevent the killer from profiting from his crime. Accordingly, the
tenancy would transfer to the victim's estate,' 67 regardless of
whether the killer was dead or alive. The use of this legal fiction,
however, has been declined by two New York courts, including
the Court of Appeals. 168 Although this rule may best satisfy our
equitable and moral principles by denying the killer all rights in
his victim's property, 169 it also forces the killer to forfeit an
162 See Pikul, 192 A.D.2d at 262, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 115; In re Estate of Bach, 53
A.D.2d 612, 612, 383 N.Y.S.2d 653, 654 (2d Dep't 1976). A finding that the killing
was an accident, committed in self-defense, or was an act of insanity would entitle
the killer to acquire property from his victim in the Surrogate's Court. See In re
Estate of Wells, 76 Misc. 2d 458, 462, 350 N.Y.S.2d 114, 119 (Sur. Ct. Nassau
County 1973).
163 Pikul, 192 A.D.2d at 262-63, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 115 (holding that when the
killer died prior to sentencing resulting in the abatement of his conviction, proof of
his crime by a preponderance of the evidence was enough to invoke equitable
principles).
164 See Cmty. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Wisan, 185 A.D.2d 870, 871, 586
N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1001 (2d Dep't 1992); Kalra v. Kalra, 149 A.D.2d 409, 410-11, 539
N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (2d Dep't 1989).
165 See Pikul, 192 A.D.2d at 263, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 115.
166 Id.
167 Note that the property devolves to the victim's estate because the victim is
dead, and all of her property then falls into the estate to be further distributed
according to the Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law.
168 See In re Estates of Covert, 97 N.Y.2d 68, 74, 761 N.E.2d 571, 575, 735
N.Y.S.2d 879, 883 (2001); Citibank v. Goldberg, 178 Misc. 2d 287, 289-90, 679
N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1998), criticized by In re Estate of
Mathew, 270 A.D.2d 416, 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (2d Dep't 2000).
169 See Wade, supra note 105, at 715 (noting that allowing the killer to gain a
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interest he held prior to the crime. 170 In addition, the law is
inadequate because it was originally adopted to combat the
impact of murder motivated by greed, 17' neglecting to account for
murders committed for other purposes.
Forfeiture results when the killer is denied even his one-half
undivided life estate. As a tenant by the entirety, the killer has a
"right to a share in the possession and the rents and profits"
generated by the property, 72 but he is stripped of that right
through the application of the legal fiction that he predeceased
his victim. 1 73 As a matter of equity, the killer is disqualified from
his right of survivorship because of his crime, 74 but the legal
fiction strips him of his life interest as well, enforcing a double
75
punishment in violation of Civil Rights Law section 79-b.1
Application of this legal fiction was repudiated, first in Citibank
v. Goldberg,176 and then again by the Court of Appeals in In re
Estates of Covert. 77
In Citibank, the Surrogate's Court
"decline[d] to employ" the "legal fiction" because it was "too
property interest from his wrongdoing is "repugnant to all sense of justice").
170 See In re Estate of Nicpon, 102 Misc. 2d 619, 621, 424 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102

(Sur. Ct. Erie County 1980) (recognizing that prior to his crime, the husband, as a
tenant by the entirety "possessed an undivided one half life interest [that] cannot be

extinguished").
171 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 512-13, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889).
172 In re Estate of Busacca, 102 Misc. 2d 567, 568, 423 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (Sur.
Ct. Nassau County 1980).
173 See In re Estates of Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d 233, 237-38, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801
(Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1975) ("[Ilt must be concluded that a woman [thirty-five]
years of age.., peacefully sleeping in her bed, would have survived the
approximately [twenty] minutes that her husband lived, were it not for his wrongful
act."); In re Estate of Sparks, 172 Misc. 642, 646, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 931 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.
County 1939) ("But for his criminal act the deceased might have outlived petitioner
[husband and killer]. It will be presumed by the court that she did so."); Bierbrauer
v. Moran, 244 A.D. 87, 91, 279 N.Y.S. 176, 180 (4th Dep't 1935) ("Except for that act
his wife would presumably have still been living when he died.").
174 See Busacca, 102 Misc. 2d at 568, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 623 ("[T]he wrongdoer is
precluded from taking as survivor by her wrongful act."); Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d at
237, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801 (noting that the killer loses his right of survivorship "when
he became the survivor solely by dint of his wrongfully extinguishing the life of his
wife").
175 See N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-b (McKinney 2008); In re Estate of Mathew,
270 A.D.2d 416, 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (2d Dep't 2000) (noting that forfeiture in
violation of Civil Rights Law section 79-b would result if the killer was "completely
deprived of all interest in property which the couple held as tenants by the
entirety").
176 178 Misc. 2d 287, 289-90, 679 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1998), criticized by Mathew, 270 A.D.2d at 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
177 97 N.Y.2d 68, 74, 761 N.E.2d 571, 575, 735 N.Y.S.2d 879, 883 (2001).
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narrowE" an application of the principle that the killer may not
profit from his crime. 178 Instead, the court applied principles of
equity to balance Riggs with the rule against forfeiture. 79 In In
re Estates of Covert, the Court of Appeals rejected the use of the
legal fiction that the killer predeceased his victim1 8 0 because the
Riggs doctrine cannot be used to cause forfeiture, only to prevent
profit.' 8 1 Therefore, Riggs only denies the killer his right of
82
survivorship.
The Riggs principle was originally adopted to prevent a killer
motivated by greed from achieving his goal and profiting through
his crime. 83 The killer was denied all interest in the property for
reasons of deterrence.' 84 This deterrence, however, is only
effective on those "contemplating homicide for the purpose of
inheriting from the victim."'8 5 For the most part, killings today
are not motivated by the desire to accelerate interest in
property. 86 The requirement, therefore, that the killer be
motivated by greed and a desire to gain title to property as a
result of his crime has long been disposed of in New York case
law. 87 Since the fear of deprivation of property no longer serves
its initial deterrent purpose, the strict application of Riggs
becomes excessive and reaches the point of forfeiture.
Although strict application of the Riggs doctrine vindicates
our moral and equitable principles, the legislature should not
adopt this approach because its underlying analysis has been
rejected by the courts in New York, and it does not properly
balance these equitable principles with laws against forfeiture.

178 Citibank, 178 Misc. 2d at 289-90, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
179 See id. at 290-91, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 239-40.
180 Covert, 97 N.Y.2d at 74, 761 N.E.2d at 575, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 883 ("There is no

need to employ the... fiction that Edward 'predeceased' Kathleen.").
181 Id. at 75-76, 761 N.E.2d at 576, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
182 Id. at 76, 761 N.E.2d at 576, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
183 See Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 508-09, 22 N.E. 188, 189 (1889)
(precluding Elmer Palmer from inheriting under his grandfather's will because he
killed the testator to prevent revocation of a bequest and to "obtain the speedy
enjoyment and immediate possession of his property").
184 See Olenn, supra note 102, at 1350 & n.45.
185 Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L.
REV. 803, 873 (1993).
186 See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 5.
187 See In re Estate of Sparks, 172 Misc. 642, 645, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 930 (Sur. Ct.
N.Y. County 1939); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 459, 169 N.Y.S. 173, 175
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1918).
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New York Case Law Granting the Killer a Life Estate

A law granting the killer a life estate in the tenancy by the
entirety should not be adopted because it contradicts the public
policy supporting the free transferability of land and creates
inconsistency-sometimes allowing the killer to benefit as a
result of his crime, and sometimes imposing forfeiture. Although
this rule appropriately denies the killer his survivorship
rights,18 8 it does not satisfy Riggs because it allows the killer to
increase his interest as a result of his crime,1 8 9 and it violates
Civil Rights Law section 79-b when the killer commits suicide.
Granting the killer a life estate in the property is contrary to
public policy and common law tradition, which favors the free
transfer of property and promotion of title marketability. 90 The
killer, as a life tenant, is restricted in his ability to sell, lease, or
mortgage the property because his interest only lasts for his
lifetime.' 9' In addition, because of his limited interest, the life
tenant is discouraged from improving the property to make it
more valuable. 192 Meanwhile, the victim's estate is denied
possession of the property until the life estate is terminated,
during which time the estate's rights to transfer and improve the
property are limited. The new statute should incorporate these
important policy issues and promote, not restrict, the transfer of
property.
Whether the killer benefits or forfeits under the application
of this rule depends on whether he remains alive after the
killing. Prior to murdering his spouse, the killer retained "no
more than a life interest in an undivided one-half of the

188

(2001).

See Covert, 97 N.Y.2d 68, 76, 761 N.E.2d 571, 576, 735 N.Y.S.2d 879, 884

189 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889) ("No one shall be
permitted to profit by... his own wrong ....).
190See In re Trust of Kellogg, 35 A.D.2d 145, 148, 316 N.Y.S.2d 293, 296 (4th
Dep't 1970) (noting that the purpose of the Rule Against Perpetuities is to prevent
restrictions on property that limit its marketability); In re Estate of Shaul, 58 Misc.
2d 967, 969, 297 N.Y.S.2d 209, 212 (Sur. Ct. Otsego County 1969) ("Public policy of
this state.., favors the free alienability of property .. ");DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 183 (noting the presumption in favor of the transfer of fee simple
absolute estates); Adam J. Katz, Comment, Heinzman v. Mason: A Decision Based in
Equity but Not an Equitable Decision, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 441, 454 (1999)
("[P]ublic policy call[s] for the free and unencumbered transfer of one's property.").
191 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 203.
192 See id.
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property." 19 3 When the slayer kills himself immediately after the
crime, he forfeits his one-half interest because the rule only
provides for a life estate. 194 Since the killer is not alive, there can
be no life estate. When the killer remains alive, though, he
benefits because the courts must elevate the one-half interest
into a life estate in the entire property. 195 The purpose of a
statutory provision is to create uniformity, 96 but this disparity in
outcome creates more uncertainty and inequality in the law.
B.

The Option That Best Implements Reform: New York Case
Law-The Killer Is Entitled to the Commuted Value of OneHalf the Life Estate

A statute codifying the case law that grants the killer a
commuted one-half life estate in the property or proceeds from
sale of the property best manifests equitable principles in order
19 7
to prevent the killer from profiting, but also to avoid forfeiture.
In addition, the outcome is consistent regardless of whether the
killer commits suicide or not. Although this approach requires
judicial determinations of the value of the killer's interest, the
resulting level of litigation will be minimal compared to the
current inundation.
The rule's adoption of public policy
demonstrates its superiority as a proposed statutory provision.
Unlike the approach granting the killer a life estate, this
rule promotes the transfer of property because it gives the killer
a monetary interest. The land is not restricted by a life estate,
but is wholly vested in the victim's estate because the killer is
denied his rights of survivorship. 198 Instead, the killer is entitled

193In re Estates of Pinnock, 83 Misc. 2d 233, 237, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801 (Sur.
Ct. Bronx County 1975) ("When both tenants by the entirety were alive, each had no
more than a life interest in an undivided one-half of the property with the possibility
that if one survived the other tenant, upon such survival, the survivor would own
the entire property outright in fee simple absolute.").
194 See In re Estate of Nicpon, 102 Misc. 2d 619, 620-21, 424 N.Y.S.2d 100,
101-02. (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1980).
195 Id. at 621, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02.
196See Wade, supra note 105, at 719 n.19 (stating that a statute will eliminate
inconsistencies in court decisions).
197See In re Estate of Mathew, 270 A.D.2d 416, 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (2d
Dep't 2000); In re Estate of Busacca, 102 Misc. 2d 567, 569, 423 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624
(Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1980).
198 See Busacca, 102 Misc. 2d at 568, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 623. This, of course,
assumes that the killer's one-half interest is satisfied when (1) the property is sold;
(2) the estate pays it; or (3) the estate mortgages the property to borrow the money.
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to the value of one-half of a life estate in the property, but is
strictly limited to that one-half to prevent both forfeiture and
profit. 199 This results in freely transferable property for both the
victim's estate and the killer.
The resulting outcome is consistent with both the Riggs
principles and Civil Rights Law section 79-b. During the tenancy
by the entirety, the killer is entitled to one-half of the "rents and
profits" generated by the estate; after his crime, he is still
entitled to one-half of the "rents and profits."20 0 The killer does
not profit, and he does not forfeit. This is consistent regardless of
whether the killer dies immediately after his crime or not.
Because the killer is only entitled to the "rents and profits"
during his life as a tenant by the entirety, 20 1 the commuted value
is projected using actuarial tables based on the killer's life
20 2
expectancy at the time that the crime was committed.
Therefore, when the killer dies prior to a calculation, his actual
life span from the commission of the crime to his death is used,
and the proceeds are distributed to his estate. 20 3 Although the
courts must make these calculations to determine the killer's
interest, the computation is a minimal burden on the judiciary.
This option is the "most satisfactory" approach to resolving
the issue, 20 4 because it provides a reliable and consistent result
20 5
and relieves the courts of excessive litigation.
IV. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND APPLICATION OF A LAW
ADOPTING THE COMMUTED ONE-HALF LIFE ESTATE MODEL

A law that grants the killer the commuted value of one-half a
life estate effectively balances the contrasting principles found in
199 See Mathew, 270 A.D.2d at 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
200 Busacca, 102 Misc. 2d at 568, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
201 See id. (illustrating that the right to "rents and profits"

lasts during the
existence of the tenancy by the entirety, which terminates upon the death of one
spouse or divorce).
202 See Estate of Veronica Barraza, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 2002, at 26, col. 6 (Sur.
Ct. Nassau County).
203 See id. In the case of murder-suicides, however, the killer's life span is
usually only minutes long, so the courts give no value to the killer's life estate. See
Margaret Valentine Turano, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney Supp. 2002).
204 See Wade, supra note 105, at 729.
205 This assertion was bolstered when a law adopting the one-half life estate
rule was proposed in the New York State Senate. See N.Y.S. 2419, 230th Sess.
(2007).
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both Riggs and Civil Rights Law section 79-b. In addition, this
approach successfully implements the necessary reforms because
it applies universally to the complex factual situations
This section, therefore, proposes
confronting the courts.
adopts
this
outcome
and
statutory
language
that
its
application
to
these
comprehensively
addresses
circumstances.
The statute should read:
"Disqualification of tenant by the entirety in certain
206
instances."
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary, a tenant by the entirety in real
property... who is convicted of murder in the second
degree as defined in section 125.25 of the penal law, or
murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of
the penal law, or manslaughter in the first degree as
defined in subdivision one or two of section 125.20 of the
penal law or manslaughter in the second degree as
defined in subdivision one of section 125.15 of the penal
law of the other spouse, shall not be entitled to any
share in such real property or monies derived therefrom,
except for"20 7 "the commuted value of a life estate in one20 8
half of the property or the proceeds from its sale."

"After all right to appeal has been exhausted, a
criminal
judgment
of
conviction
establishing
accountability for the ... killing of the decedent
conclusively establishes the convicted individual as the
decedent's killer for purposes of this section. In the
absence of a conviction, the court, upon the petition of an
interested person, must determine whether, under the
preponderance of evidence standard, the individual
would be found criminally accountable for the.., killing
of the decedent. If the court determines that, under that
standard, the individual would be found criminally
accountable for the ... killing of the decedent, the

206

SURROGATE'S COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 19, at 32.

Id.
In re Estate of Mathew, 270 A.D.2d 416, 417, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (2d
Dep't 2000).
207
208
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determination conclusively establishes that individual
'209
as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section.
In the event of an abatement of the conviction as a
result of the killer's death, the conviction creates a
presumption of guilt and "the burden of demonstrating
the verdict to have been defective lies with the party

challenging

it.

' 210

If the challenging party does not meet

that burden, then the conviction "conclusively
establishes th[e] individual as the decedent's killer for
'211
purposes of this section.
Under this statute, a killer who commits murder in the first
or second degree or manslaughter in the first or second degree
will be entitled to the commuted value of a one-half life estate in
the property. The statute specifically provides that a criminal
conviction is not necessary. When the killer dies prior to
conviction from suicide or otherwise, or in the event of an
acquittal, the Surrogate's Court may determine by a
preponderance of the evidence whether the statute will apply.
Furthermore, if a conviction is abated through operation of law
because of the killer's death, this conviction may be used to
212
demonstrate that the statute should apply.
The commuted value of a one-half life estate is a lump sum
distribution based on actuarial tables incorporating life
expectancy and interest rates. 21 3 The value of the life estate is
determined, divided in half, and disbursed to the killer. When
the killer dies prior to this computation, the money is distributed
to his estate, while the victim's estate takes title to the real
property.
In the case of Martin Foster, there was no conviction because
he committed suicide after he killed his wife Margaret. Under
the statute, Martin will still be prevented from benefiting from
his crime if the Surrogate's Court determines by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was criminally liable for his wife's death.
In finding Martin liable, the court would implement the statute
and terminate Martin's right of survivorship, and title to the
209 UNIF. PROBATE CODE
210

1993).

§ 2-803(g) (1990).

In re Estate of Pikul, 192 A.D.2d 259, 263, 601 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (1st Dep't

§ 2-803(g).
212 Pikul, 192 A.D.2d at 263, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 115.
213 See DUKEMINIER ETAL., supra note 9, at 197.
211
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property will pass to Margaret's estate to be distributed
accordingly. Martin is entitled to the commuted value of a onehalf life estate in the Rochester property. Since Martin was
thirty-five years old when he committed the crime, applying a
five percent interest rate, the life estate factor is 0.83989.214
Estimating the appraisal of the property at $100,000, Martin is
entitled to a one-half life estate worth $41,994.50.215 However,
because Martin killed himself immediately after he killed his
wife, his actual life span, only seconds long, is used, and his
2 16
interest is valued at zero.
This statute adopts the principles of equity and morality
endorsed by Riggs, while enforcing the rights of the killer under
Civil Rights Law section 79-b. The statute provides a uniform
outcome, regardless of where the crime is committed or when the
killer dies. To eliminate the need for judicial lawmaking and
reduce the potential for litigation, it addresses numerous
situations that the courts have been confronted with in the past,
including murder-suicide and the abatement of a conviction.
Ultimately, this statute achieves all of the goals of reform:
reliability, efficiency and economy, and the elimination of judicial
legislation.
CONCLUSION

As a result of Elmer E. Palmer's poisoning of his
grandfather, New York case law was infused with the maxim
that "[n]o one shall be permitted to ...take advantage of his own
wrong, or to... acquire property by his own crime." 2 17 In an
attempt to honor this noble public policy, the New York courts
produced conflicting decisions when determining the property
interests of a slayer who kills his fellow tenant by the entirety.
To prevent further inconsistencies, the New York legislature
must enact legislation. A law like the one proposed in this Note,

214 See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-7(d)(7) tbl.S (2008). The remainder interest factor is
0.16011. By subtracting this factor from the number one, the life estate factor is
0.83989. See id. § 25.2512-5(d)(2)(iii).

215 0.83989 x $100,000 = $83,989.
$83,989 + 2 = $41,994.50.
216 See Margaret Valentine Turano, Supplementary Practice Commentaries,
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney Supp. 2002).
217 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889).
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that grants a killer the commuted value of a one-half life estate
in the property, exemplifies the equitable principle adopted in
Riggs v. Palmer, preserves the killer's rights under Civil Rights
Law, and effectively embodies the necessary reform.

